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Sliding Backwards: The Impact of California 
Evidence Code Section 1108 on Character 
Evidence, Rape Shield Laws and the Presumption 
of Innocence 
Celia McGuinness* 
The last twenty years have seen striking changes in the law of charac-
ter evidence in criminal trials. For hundreds of years, common law pro-
hibited the use of character evidence against a defendant in a criminal 
trial. 1 It was believed that although character evidence may be relevant, it 
was so prejudicial that its introduction would deny the defendant a fair 
trial. 2 When a woman complained of rape, however, common law allowed 
the defendant to use her sexual character against her. 3 It was considered 
relevant to show her "character for unchastity," i.e., "her propensity to en-
gage in consensual sexual relations outside of marriage.,,4 
In the 1970s, rape shield laws dramatically changed that position. 
These laws prohibited the use of a rape complainant's sexual history ex-
cept under limited circumstances.5 The laws protected women and refo-
cused the case on proving the defendant's guilt rather than proving the 
complainant's morality. 
In 1995, another dramatic change occurred. California, following the 
federal system's lead,6 enacted section 1108 of the California Evidence 
Code.7 It enables prosecutors to use a defendant's history of sexual bad 
*Celia McGuinness is a trial attorney at the San Francisco Public Defender's Office. She is 
currently a Visiting Clinical Professor at the University of San Francisco Law School, 
teaching the Criminal Law Clinic during the spring semester, 1998. 
1. See generally 1 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 334 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing 
the universal rule against character evidence). 
2. See id. 
3. See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A 
Proposalfor the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 830-48 (1986). 
4. /d. at 765-66. 
5. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1l03(c) (West 1995); CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 1995). 
All subsequent statutory references are to the California Evidence Code, unless otherwise 
stated. 
6. See S. COMM. CRIM. PROC., COMM. REp., A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) 
[hereinafter CRIM. PROC. REPORT1. 
7. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West Supp. 1997). 
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acts to show his propensity to commit a sex crime.8 Never before has 
character evidence been admitted to show that the defendant is the kind of 
person who would commit the crime with which he is charged. As with 
rape shield laws, the stated purpose of this change was to aid victims of 
sexual assault. 9 In actuality, the law does great injustice both to complain-
ants and to defendants in sex crime cases. 
The law eliminates the protection against conviction for who you are, 
not what you did. It makes any evidence of any prior sex crimes admissi-
ble. lO It places almost no limit on the nature of the prior act which may be 
used. 1 1 It requires no similarity to the offense charged. 12 The prior act 
need not have resulted in a conviction or even an arrest. 13 A mere allega-
tion is enough.14 The evidence may be used in the prosecution's case in 
chief; the prosecutor need not wait until the defendant raises his good 
character. 15 
Section 1108 also endangers the advances made by rape shield laws for 
complainants in sex crimes. Although section 1108 is intended to aid vic-
tims of sex crimes, it reflects an attitude which rape shield laws were sup-
posed to have squelched: the attitude that a woman's credibility is insuffi-
cient to sustain a criminal complaint. Moreover, it endangers the rape 
shield laws themselves. The constitutional infirmities inherent in section 
1108 may undermine the protections of rape shield laws upon which 
women have come to rely. The dramatic changes in the law of character 
evidence will, in this case, turn out to be a step backwards. 
This article first explains the nature and goals of laws prohibiting the 
use of character against the defendant. Part I and IT describe how rape 
shield laws provided similar protections to complainants in sex crimes. 
Part ill describes section 1108, which explicitly allows character evidence 
against a defendant in almost every sex-related crime. Part IV points out 
how the new law is a step backwards in protecting women. It emphasizes 
the risk that the statute will cause innocent people to be convicted. Finally, 
it demonstrates how section 1108 violates the constitutional principles of 
fundamental fairness and reciprocity, which may weaken the rape shield 
laws we now take for granted. 
8. See id. 
9. See ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMM. REP., AB. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. 
3 (Cal. 1995) [hereinafter PUBLIC SAFETY REPORT]. 
10. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108. 
11. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. 
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I. THE COMMON LAW DISPARITY: THE USE OF 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE WAS PROHIBITED AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS BUT ADMITTED AGAINST COMPLAINANTS 
IN SEX CRIMES 
A. DEFENDANTS 
Character evidence means evidence of a person's moral character: the 
propensity to do something because of the kind of person one is. 16 Before 
section 1108 was enacted, the prohibition against the prosecution's intro-
duction of character evidence in its case in chief was "the universal rule."l7 
If prior crimes evidence was admitted, "[t]he prosecutor could not argue, 
nor could the court instruct, that the jury could consider such evidence to 
prove the defendant's character (as opposed to some valid, non-character 
purpose), let alone that proof of the defendant's character could be used to 
prove the defendant's guilt in the current offense.,,18 
The exception was codified in Evidence Code section 1102, which 
provides that evidence of the defendant's character is admissible only if 
offered by the defendant or the prosecution to rebut character evidence of-
fered by the defendant. 19 The prosecution may not introduce the defen-
dant's character in its case in chief. 
Character evidence is excluded because of its inflammatory effect on 
juries.20 Witkin states: "[s]uch evidence is some indication of the likeli-
hood of [the defendant's] guilt and is therefore relevant, but it would be 
highly prejudicial in its tendency to draw the attention of the jury away 
from the evidence dealing with the crime charged. ,,21 One aspect of the 
16. See WITKIN, supra note 1. 
17. Id. 
18. Albert J. Menaster, The Floodgates Have Opened, 23 CAL. Arr'ys FOR CRIM. JUST. 
F., 1996, at 44. California allows the admission of prior bad acts against a defendant if 
relevant to prove some disputed issue in the case. Evidence Code section 11 0 1 (b) allows it 
for motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or 
accident, "or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or an at-
tempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim 
consented .... " CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1995). Of course, courts have the dis-
cretion to exclude the evidence if it is more prejudicial than probative. See CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 352 (West 1995). Recently, the courts have expanded the rules to broaden the cir-
cumstances in which such prior crimes evidence is admissible. See People v. Balcom, 7 
Cal. 4th 414, 422 (1994); People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 404 (1994). The practical effect 
has been to make almost all prior bad acts admissible against a defendant to prove some 
point at issue. Since intent is almost always at issue, it has become very easy for prosecu-
tors to use a defendant's prior act to show his intent in the new offense. The proscription 
against using prior bad acts explicitly to show character remains, however. 
19. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1102 (West 1995). 
20. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 194 (3d ed. 1940). 
21. WITKIN, supra note 1. 
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presumption of innocence is the fundamental axiom that the accused must 
be tried only for what he did, not for who he is.22 
As will be argued below, evidence of the defendant's past acts may 
prove little or nothing about his propensity to commit the current crime. 
The proof of whether someone committed a crime lies in the evidence of 
the incident itself, not in whether he is the kind of person who might be 
capable of committing a crime. The danger of character evidence is that it 
distracts the jury from judging the real, physical, direct and circumstantial 
evidence of a crime, and instead leads to a judgment of the defendant him-
self. In my practice, I have seen that jurors' verdicts may, consciously or 
subconsciously, tum on whether or not they liked the defendant. Jurors 
may acquit, not from an overt desire to excuse someone they like, but 
rather from the natural inclination to be more skeptical of evidence against 
a person whom they consider worthy of protection. In the minds of jurors, 
the legal presumptions of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt are often construed more strictly in favor of a person who is 
considered a good person, or at least, not a bad one. 
B. COMPLAINANTS 
Although character evidence against defendants has always been ex-
cluded, the character of a woman who complained of sexual assault was 
traditionally fair game. 23 A woman's character for sexual conduct was 
considered highly relevant and probative of two things: her likelihood to 
consent to sex and her character for truthfulness in general. 24 A woman 
who said yes to sex before was considered likely to say yes again.25 A 
woman who was sexually experienced had loose morals and, therefore, 
was generally considered less credible.26 
Naturally, having one's morals attacked on the witness stand is a hu-
miliating experience. Anyone, no matter how injured, would be hesitant to 
expose herself to a trial of her past. 27 Moreover, the rule allowing the vic-
tim's sexual character into evidence promoted the idea that there are two 
22. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517,523 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
23. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 150 Cal. App. 2d 594,601 (1957). 
24. See Garth E. Hire, Holding Husbands and Lovers Accountable for Rape: Eliminating 
the "Defendant" Exception of Rape Shield Laws, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 591, 
593-94 (1996); Galvin, supra note 3. 
25. "[AJ woman who has previously consented to an act of sexual intercourse would be 
more likely to consent again to such an act, thereby negating the charge that force and vio-
lence were used against her in order to accomplish the rape." Walker, 150 Cal. App. 2d at 
601. 
26. "[P]revious intercourse with other persons may be shown, as tending to disprove the 
allegation of force, and such evidence would seem to be highly proper, as it must be obvious 
to all that there would be less probability of resistance upon the part of one already de-
bauched in mind and body, than there would be in the case of a pure and chaste female." 
People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223 (1856). 
27. See Hire, supra note 24. 
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kinds of women: "good" women who deserve protection by the jury system 
and "bad" women who do not. 28 
II. RAPE SHIELD LAWS MADE THE COMPLAINANT'S 
SEXUAL CHARACTER IRRELEV ANT 
Beginning in the 1970' s, California and most other jurisdictions en-
acted evidentiary rules popularly known as Rape Shield laws.29 California 
enacted two statutes, sections 11 03( c) and 782 of the California Evidence 
Code.30 Section 11 03( c) makes evidence of prior sexual conduct by a 
complaining witness inadmissible to prove that she consented.31 Section 
782 allows evidence of prior sexual conduct to attack a complainant's 
credibility only if the defense makes a sworn offer of proof concerning its 
relevance and the court holds a relevancy hearing outside the presence of 
h · 32 t e JUry. 
Even if a defendant offers the sworn proof and affirmatively proves 
relevance, the court may nevertheless exclude sexual conduct evidence as 
more prejudicial than probative.33 Courts caution that the relevance as-
serted must relate to credibility only and not to consent. "Great care must 
be taken to insure that this exception to the general rule barring evidence 
of a complaining witness's prior sexual conduct ... does not impermissi-
bly encroach upon the rule itself and become a 'back door' for admitting 
otherwise inadmissible evidence.,,34 
Thus, courts have supported the policy behind the rape shield laws 
even when defense attorneys look for creative ways around it. For exam-
ple, in People v. Steele, the defendant was accused of raping, in his car, a 
woman whom he had just met. 35 The defense sought to introduce evidence 
that the woman had, at an earlier date, had sex in a car with another man 
28. "The historical rule allowing the evidence [of complainants' sexual history] may be 
more a creature of the one-time male fantasy of the 'girls men date and the girls men marry' 
than one of logical inference." People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 690-91 (1976). 
29. See Galvin, supra note 3, at 765,830-48; Peter M. Hazelton, Rape Shield Laws: 
Limits on Zealous Advocacy, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 35, 36 (1991). 
30. California also passed two statutes concerning jury instructions in rape and related 
sexual offense cases. Penal Code section 1127(d) prohibits judges from instructing juries 
that consent in the past is proof of consent in this instance or that prior sexual conduct in 
and of itself is proof of credibility of the complaining witness. CAL. PENAL CODE § lI27(d) 
(West 1995). Section lI27(e) prohibits use of the hackneyed phrase "unchaste character." 
CAL. PENALCODE§ 1127(e) (West 1995). 
31. CAL. EVID. CODE § 11 03( c)( 1). This prohibition applies to conduct with people other 
than the defendant; conduct with the defendant remains admissible under section 
1103( c )(2). 
32. CAL. EVID. CODE § 782. 
33. See People v. Rioz, 161 Cal. App. 3d 905,916-17 (1984). 
34. !d. at 918-19. 
35. People v. Steele, 210 Cal. App. 3d 67, 69-70 (1989). 
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she had just met. 36 The defense argued that it was evidence of the 
woman's modus operandi, which is a standard use of prior bad acts evi-
dence. 37 What the defense was really trying to prove was that "she did it 
before, therefore, she would do it again." The California Supreme Court 
ruled that the fact that the woman had done something before under similar 
circumstances did not prove her modus operandi. 38 Just because she had 
said yes before did not prove that she said yes this time. The evidence was 
not admitted. 39 
ill. THE NEW LAW: EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1108 
After the advent of rape shield laws, the status of character evidence 
for both victims and defendants was in balance. The defense could not use 
a complainant's sexual character against her and the prosecution could not 
use a defendant's sexual character against him. Section 1108, enacted in 
1995, changed all that. It allows the prosecution to use evidence of prior 
sex -related crimes to show a defendant's propensity to commit the crime 
with which he is currently charged.4o Now, the assumption, "she did it be-
fore, therefore she would do it again" applies to defendants. 
The essential language of the statute is: "In a criminal action in which 
the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's 
commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible 
by section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to section 
352.,,41 Once the reader works out the double negative, it appears to mean 
36. See id. at 72-73. 
37. See id. at 76; see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b). 
38. See Steele, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 76. 
39. See id. 
40. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108. 
41. The entire statute reads: 
1108. (a) In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evi-
dence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made in-
admissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352. 
(b) In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this section, the people shall 
disclose the evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of 
the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least 30 days before the 
scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause. 
(c) This section shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evi-
dence under any other section of this code. 
(d) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
(l) "Sexual offense" means a crime under the law of a state or of the United States 
that involved any of the following: 
(A) Any conduct proscribed by Section 243.4, 261, 261.5, 262, 264.1, 266c, 286, 
288, 288a, 288.2, 288.5, or 289, or subdivision (b), (c), or (d) of Section 311.2, or Section 
311.3, 311.4, 311.10, 311.11, 314, or 647.6 of the Penal Code. 
(B) Contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an object 
and the genitals or anus of another person. 
(C) Contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant and any 
part of another person's body. 
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that there is no limitation-Dther than section 352-to the possible uses of 
other crimes evidence concerning sexual offenses. In its reference to sec-
tion 1101, which prohibits character evidence, the statute by its terms 
permits the use of prior sex-related offenses as proof of the defendant's 
character: his predisposition to commit the crime with which he is charged. 
Lest there be any doubt that the legislature intended to permit character 
evidence to show predisposition, the legislative history is explicit. The 
Legislative Counsel's Digest summarizes the bill as follows: 
Existing law provides that, except as specified, evidence of a per-
son's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the 
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific 
instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to 
prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. 
This bill would create a further exception to this rule by providing 
that in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a 
sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another 
sexual offense or offenses is not inadmissible under the above rule, 
'f' d 42 except as speci Ie . 
The Assembly Digest of the bill states, "[ e ]vidence admitted under this 
new section would be subject to rational assessment by a jury as evidence 
concerning the probability or improbability that the defendant has been 
falsely or mistakenly implicated in commission of [sic] charged offense. ,,43 
The author himself, James Rogan (R-Glendale), is quoted in the bill's 
analyses by the Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure.44 In this report, 
he explains: 
Under current law, evidence that a particular defendant has com-
mitted rape, acts of child molestation, or other sexual offense 
against other victims is not necessarily admissible in a trial where 
the defendant is being accused of a subsequent sexual offense. 
The propensity to commit sexual offenses is not a common attrib-
ute among the general public. Therefore, evidence that a particular 
defendant has such a propensity is especially probative and should 
(D) Deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily in-
jury, or physical pain on another person. 
(E) An attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in this paragraph. 
(2) "Consent" shall have the same meaning as provided in Section 261.6 of the Penal 
Code, except that it does not include consent which is legally ineffective because of the age, 
mental disorder, or developmental or physical disability of the victim. CAL. EVID. CODE § 
1108. 
42. A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST (Cal. 
1995), 
43. PUBLIC SAFETY REPORT, supra note 9, at l. 
44. James Rogan, CRIM. PRoc. REPORT., supra note 6, at 2. 
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be considered by [the trier] of fact when determining the credibil-
ity of a victim's testimony. This proposal will amend the Evidence 
Code so as to establish, in sexual offense actions, a presumption of 
admissibility for evidence that the defendant has committed similar 
crimes on other occasions.45 
Significantly, the statute does not require that a defendant have been 
convicted previously of a sex-related crime. Nor does it require an arrest. 
The mere fact of the previous allegation is admissible to show that he has 
the character of a sex offender. Gossip, in the form of reputation or opin-
ion, may be sufficient. 
What prior sex-related crimes does the statute permit? Nearly any 
kind. The statute specifically makes twenty-one offenses admissible, in-
cluding pornography distribution offenses, as well as violent acts.46 It in-
cludes offenses which are misdemeanors and wobblers, i.e., crimes that 
may be charged either as a felony or as a misdemeanor.47 For example, 
knowing development, duplication, or exchange of any video or photo-
graph depicting sexual conduct by a minor; indecent exposure; and annoy-
ing or molesting a child under age eighteen are all misdemeanors for the 
first offense.48 Several of the other pornography distribution offenses, 
such as distribution of lewd material to a minor, are wobblers, as are sex-
ual batte~ and statutory rape--consensual sex with a person under age 
eighteen.4 Eight of the listed statutes require no physical contact whatso-
ever.50 
Additionally, section 1108 sweeps most other criminal sexual conduct 
under its ambit by including "[ c ]ontact, without consent, between any part 
of the defendant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another 
person" and "[ c ]ontact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of 
the defendant and any part of another person's body.,,51 As the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee pointed out, "the inclusion of these acts are already 
covered under sexual battery and therefore seem redundant.,,52 
Section 1108 also permits evidence of acts "[ d]eriving sexual pleasure 
or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain 
on another person," 53 which appears to make evidence of sadomasochistic 
45. /d. 
46. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (d)(1)(A). 
47. See id. 
48. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EVIDENCE IN CIVIL TRIALS-ADMISSIBILITY OF A 
CRIMINAL CONVICTION BASED UPON EVIDENCE WHICH IS INADMISSIBLE IN A CIVIL PRO-
CEEDING, S. JUDICIARY COMM. REp., A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. 3-4 (Cal. 1995) 
[hereinafter S. JUDICIARY REPORT]. 
49. See id. 
50. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (d)(1)(A). 
51. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1108 (d)(1)(B) and (C). 
52. S. JUDICIARY REpORT, supra note 48, at 10. 
53. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108(d)(1)(D). 
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practices admissible. Finally, it ends with a catchall provision for "[a]n 
attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct" described in the statute.54 
Section 1108 does not require that the previous bad conduct have any 
similarity to the offense for which the defendant is currently on trial. An 
Assembly Committee Report stated that "[t]his legislation would not gen-
erally authorize the admission of evidence of other 'bad acts' by the defen-
dant, but only evidence of criminal sexual offenses of the same type as 
those with which he is formally charged.,,55 Yet, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Analysis noted, "[t]he text of the measure itself, however, does 
not restrict the introduction into evidence of 'similar' crimes.,,56 The Ju-
diciary Committee Analysis then queried, "[s]hould not the measure be 
narrowed to allow the admissibility of similar sexual offenses?,,57 
The bill was never amended. It passed into law without any restric-
tions on the nature of the evidence which may be admitted. As the Senate 
Judiciary Committee report concluded, "[t]he measure makes the value 
judgment that an alleged misdemeanor indecent exposure incident is evi-
dence of the character of a defendant who is charged with spousal rape or 
sodomy.,,58 
Three advisory committees of the U.S. Judicial Conference unani-
mously ~posed the language and intent of section 1108 in the federal 
context.5 Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 are almost identical to sec-
tion 1108. 60 The U.S. Judicial Conference Committees on Evidence, 
Criminal Rules and Civil Rules each reviewed Federal Rules of Evidence 
413-415.61 The Judicial Conference Report stated: 
It is important to note the highly unusual unanimity of the 
members of the Standing and Advisory Committees, com-
posed of over 40 judges, practicing lawyers, and acade-
micians, in taking the view that Rules 413-415 are unde-
sirable. Indeed, the only supporters of the Rules were 
representatives of the Department of Justice. 62 
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW LAW 
Aside from supplanting years of jurisprudence which prohibited char-
54. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108(d)(1)(E). 
55. PUBLIC SAFETY REpORT, supra note 9, at 2. 
56. CRIM. PROC. REPORT, supra note 6, at 9. 
57. Id. at 10. 
58. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added). 
59. See CRIM. PROC. REPORT, supra note 6, at 5. 
60. FED. R. EVID. §§ 413-415 (1997). 
61. See CRIM. PROC. REPORT, supra note 6, at 5. 
62. Judicial Conference Submits Report on New Evidence Rules, 56 CRIM. L. REP. 
(BNA) No. 19, at 1455 (Feb. 15, 1995). 
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acter evidence per se, section 1108 poses three serious problems. First, it 
revives the corroboration requirement in rape cases, or at least provides an 
excuse not to prosecute cases where the defendant has no history of sex-
related crimes. Second, it increases the risk of convicting the innocent. 
Finally, it violates due process, creating a constitutional infirmity which 
may jeopardize our current rape shield laws. 
A. A CHALLENGE TO WOMEN'S CREDIBILITY 
As late as 1972, fifteen states required corroboration of a complain-
ant's testimony in order to sustain a rape conviction.63 Some required cor-
rob oration of each material element: force, penetration, and the identity of 
the accused.64 Others required corroboration by "material facts and cir-
cumstances which tend to support the testimony of the complainant. ,,65 
Three rationales were generally given to justify the corroboration re-
quirement: the emotion raised in a jury by a rape charge, the difficulty of 
disproving a rape charge, and the frequency of false rape charges.66 The 
first rationale raises the concern that in a rape case, jurors will be unable to 
retain their impartiality. Because of the nature of the offense and from 
sympathy for a "wronged female," the jury may rush to convict.67 This ra-
tionale is belied by the low conviction rate for sex offenses.68 Yet, implicit 
is the idea that a conviction on merely the complainant'S word would be 
unjust. A conviction on her word alone would be a conviction on insuffi-
cient evidence. 
The second justification-that rape charges are difficult to defend 
against because there are rarely independent witnesses69 -also reveals 
hesitance to believe a complainant. It is indeed difficult to defend a charge 
when the only witnesses are the defendant and the complainant. But that 
holds true of many offenses for which there is no corroboration require-
ment. 70 A late-night mugging may well have no other witnesses. "The 
corroboration requirement, in effect, is a prior determination that if the 
prosecution's case stands solely on the testimony of the complainant, the 
63. See Donald J. Friedman, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 
81 YALEL.J.1365, 1367-70(1972). 
64. See id.at 1369-70. 
65. See id.at 1369. A cautionary instruction, that "in prosecutions for sex offenses, accu-
sations are easy to make and difficult to disprove, and the testimony of complaining wit-
nesses should be examined with caution," has been approved well into the 1970's. See 
People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 394 (1967); People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 
874 (1975). 
66. See Friedman, supra note 63, at 1373. 
67. See id. at 1378. 
68. See id. at 1379. 
69. See id. at 1382-84. 
70. Corroboration was required at common law for perjury charges but for no other of-
fense. See id. at 1366. 
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defendant shall win.,,71 In other words, without corroboration, a prosecu-
tion should not prevail. 
The third rationale, the prevalence of false accusations,72 simply states 
more explicitly what the other two rationales imply: without corroboration, 
we cannot trust that a woman is telling the truth. This justification main-
tains that a woman is likely to make false rape charges from shame or to 
protect her reputation after having consensual sex; to shield another man 
who has made her pregnant; from hatred; for blackmail; or for simple no-
toriety.73 "Psychiatrists [attribute false rape allegations] to the fact that for 
some women it is better to be raped than ignored.,,74 
The corroboration requirement is gone but not forgotten. These laws 
have been repudiated for the most part. Some states, however, still require 
corroboration if the victim's testimony is impeached or incredible. 75 
While they existed, these corroboration laws did a great disservice: "a rape 
trial involved a systematic process of disqualification of the complainant's 
story.,,76 The legacy of rape corroboration requirements "casts a shadow, 
in that the law still suggests that rape cases and r~e complainants occupy 
a separate category when it comes to credibility.,,7 
Why should a woman's testimony need corroboration? Legalistic ra-
tionales aside, Susan Estrich suggests that the corroboration requirement 
arose in '''response to a man's nightmarish fantasy of being charged with 
simple rape' and the 'institutionalization of the law's distrust of women 
victims through rules of evidence and procedure.'" 78 
Section 1108 appears to revive that nasty fantasy. Underlying section 
1108 is the attitude that a woman's word is insufficient. Section 1108 
implies that a woman's testimony cannot secure a conviction standing on 
its own. Look again at Senator Rogan's comment: "[E]vidence that a par-
ticular defendant has such a propensity [to commit sexual offenses] ... 
should be considered by [the trier] of fact when determining the credibility 
of a victim's testimony.,,79 The Assembly Committee on Public Safety 
71. Id. at 1382. 
72. See id. at 1373-78. 
73. See id. at 1373. 
74. Id. at 1373 n.60. As a criminal defense practitioner, I have seen women lie from ha-
tred or because they fear another man more than they fear the defendant. Some women do, 
therefore, make false rape complaints. In my experience, however, women do not lie more 
frequently about rape than about other matters. Nor do women in general lie more than men 
in general. 
75. See Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms, Feminist Reforms, 
19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 155-56 (1996). 
76. Id. at 155. 
77. Id. at 156. 
78. Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon? Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Recon-
ceptualizing its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REv. 677, 694 (1996) (quoting SUSAN ESTRICH, 
REAL RAPE 72 (1987». 
79. PUBLIC SAFETY REpORT, supra note 9, at 2 (emphasis added). 
108 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
considered that "[e]vidence admitted under this new section would be 
subject to rational assessment by a jury as evidence concerning the prob-
ability or improbability that the defendant has been falsely or mistakenly 
implicated in commission of [sic] charged offense. ,,80 The focus is on 
bolstering the woman's credibility, rather than proving the defendant's 
guilt. 
In no other category of crime is the defendant's propensity to commit 
the crime admissible. Perhaps, this is because in no other crime is the vic-
tim's testimony automatically suspect. California, along with other states, 
has made a legislative statement, in section 411 of the California Evidence 
Code, that the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.81 Section 
1108 revives the corroboration requirement through the back door. It per-
petuates the myth that the victim's credibility in sex cases is categorically 
suspect. 
In addition to undermining the credibility of rape victims, section 1108 
may provide police and prosecutors an excuse not to prosecute sex of-
fenses. Because of heavy caseloads, "[investigators] work from a profile 
of the kind of case likely to get a conviction."s2 "[Victims] left out of that 
profile are people of color, prostitutes, drug users and people raped by ac-
quaintances,,,s3 in other words, those whose credibility is perceived to be 
suspect. The availability of section 1108 evidence may well become part 
of the "success profile," leading police and prosecutors to ignore cases 
where it is not available. Thus, the state has an excuse not to prosecute 
where there is no corroboration for a woman's complaint. Cases with no 
section 1108 evidence look less winnable because those cases rely more 
heavily on the victim's testimony. 
B. A DANGER TO THE INNOCENT 
The implicit premise of section 1108 is that a complainant's testimony 
needs corroboration. The explicit premise is that the defendant's character 
80. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
81. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 411 (West 1995). This section does have some exceptions, 
e.g., prohibiting the conviction of a defendant solely upon the testimony of an accomplice 
(CAL. PENAL CODE § 1101), and another archaic expression for procuring abortion or luring 
a girl under age eighteen into prostitution (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1108). Id. For other states' 
statutes, see Hunter, supra note 75, at 167 n.199. 
82. Candy J. Cooper, Nowhere to Tum for Rape Victims: High Proportion of Cases 
Tossed Aside by Oakland Police, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 16,1990, at AI. 
83. Id. In 1989, almost 25% of women who reported a rape to the Oakland, California 
Police Department were told, in effect, that they were lying, even before their cases had 
been investigated. The reports were closed and labeled "unfounded." Police said those 
cases "were hopelessly tainted by women who are transient, uncooperative, untruthful or not 
credible as witnesses in court." [d. After an investigation, police concluded that 90% per-
cent of the cases labeled unfounded in 1989 and 1990 actually occurred. See Alix Christie, 
Police Admit Error in Dismissed '89-'90 Rape Cases, OAKLAND TRIB., Feb. 2, 1991, at 
All. 
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provides that corroboration. "The propensity to commit sexual offenses is 
not a common attribute among the general pUblic. Therefore, evidence that 
a particular defendant has such a propensity is especially probative .... ,,84 
Are prior bad acts probative of guilt in a current offense? That premise has 
not been conclusively proven. Yet, jurors may give sexual character evi-
dence undue emphasis. As a result, a defendant may be convicted because 
of his perceived character when the evidence would otherwise not merit a 
conviction. 
The statute's premise that prior crimes evidence is probative, i.e., that 
having previously committed one of the enumerated offenses, a defendant 
is more likely to commit another sexual offense, is not necessarily born out 
by recidivism studies. In a 1989 study from the Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, researchers measured re-arrest rates as a measure of recidivism. 85 
Almost 32% of burglars were re-arrested for burglary, 24.8% of drug of-
fenders were re-arrested for drug offenses, and 19.6% of violent robbers 
were re-arrested for robbery.86 The recidivism rate for rape, at 7.7%, was 
lower than all other crimes except homicide. 87 These figures contradict 
bill author James Rogan's belief that prior sex-related crimes are probative 
of current guilt. 88 
Psychological research does not necessarily support the premise, 
known as "trait theory," that character evidence predicts behavior.89 Trait 
theory has been highly criticized in the last decade: 
[E]mpirical research, however, has not only failed to validate trait 
theory but has generally rejected it. 'The initial assumptions of 
trait-state theory were logical, inherently plausible, and also con-
sistent with common sense and intuitive impressions about per-
sonality. Their real limitation turned out to be empirical-they 
simply have not been supported adequately.' Instead, the research 
shows that behavior is largely shaped by situational determinants 
84. PUBLIC SAFETY REpORT, supra note 9, at 2 (statement of Assemblyman James Rogan, 
author of A.B. 882). 
85. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense 
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 572 n.182 (1994) (citing Allen J. Beck, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 19836 (1989». 
86. See id. 
87. See id. A 1997 Bureau of Justice Statistics study compared recidivism for any crime, 
not just rape. It found that about 41 % of all violent offenders had been arrested for new 
felonies but only 19.5% of rapists were arrested for a new crime. See Matthew Purdy, 
States Taking Swift Action to Confine Sex Offenders, S.P. EXAMINER, June 29, 1997, at A8. 
88. I was unable to find any support for the proposition that the other offenses enumer-
ated in section 1108 were evidence of a particular trait of character. I invited Assemblyman 
(now U.S. Congressman) Rogan's office to provide the source of his assertion about the 
probative value of character evidence in sex crimes. No answer was ever provided. 
89. See Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code 
section 352 and Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1051-52 
(1984) [hereinafter Mendez, California's New Law]. 
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that do not lend themselves easily to predictions about individual 
behavior.90 
Trait theory in the context of character evidence has been the subject 
of numerous legal articles since 1984.91 Professor Mendez takes a strong 
position that traditional trait theory has been discredited and recent re-
search is too new to have practical application. 92 Others express varying 
levels of confidence in trait theory.9 However, trait theorists "willingly 
concede that they are unable to predict a single instance of behavior on a 
particular occasion with confidence.,,94 In other words, one cannot rely on 
a person's character traits to "accurately predict a single, isolated instance 
of conduct" at issue in a criminal charge.95 
The research clearly shows that the more dissimilar the situation, the 
less likely behavior will be consistent.96 As noted by Mendez, "[ e ]ven 
seemingly trivial situational differences may reduce correlations to zero.,,97 
Bryden and Park conclude that "the character trait 'sex criminal,' a pro-
pensity to commit many different sex crimes, may not exist. Even the pro-
pensity to commit a specific sex crime such as rape may be situational.,,98 
90. Id. (quoting WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 6, 22 (1968)). 
91. See, e.g., Bryden & Park, supra note 85; Mark Cammack, Using the Doctrine of 
Chances to Prove Actus Reus in Child Abuse and Acquaintance Rape: People v. Ewoldt 
Reconsidered, 29 U.c. DAVIS L. REv. 355 (1996); David Crump, How Should We Treat 
Character Evidence Offered to Prove Conduct? 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 279 (1987); Susan 
Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 
27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504 (1991); Donald A. Dripps, Relevant but Prejudicial Exculpatory 
Evidence: Rationality Versus Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 1389 (1996); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality 
and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1986-87); Mendez, Califor-
nia's New Law, supra note 89; Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for 
a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221 (1996) [hereinafter Mendez, Search for a Stable 
Personality]; David Ring, Comment, Rush to Judgment: Criminal Propensity Clothed as 
Credibility Evidence in the Post-Proposition 8 Era of California Criminal Law, 15 
WHITTIERL. REv. 241 (1994). 
92. See Mendez, California's New Law, supra note 89, at 1051-52; Mendez, Search for a 
Stable Personality, supra note 91, at 227-28. 
93. See, e.g., Cammack, supra note 91, at 400 (rejecting "crude global character trait 
theories which posit general character traits assumed to produce consistent conduct in di-
verse situations" and discussing non-character purposes for similar crimes evidence); Men-
dez, Search for a Stable Personality, supra note 91, at 233,237 (proposing a more sophisti-
cated theory which shows some correlation of behavior across situations, though not the 
direct correspondence which trait theorists expected, and recognizing that if the new theory 
were capable of predicting behavior, it would require expert testimony to explain the vari-
ables involved). 
94. Davies, supra note 91, at 517. 
95. Leonard, supra note 91, at 29. 
96. See Mendez, California'S New Law, supra note 89, at 1052. 
97. Id. 
98. Bryden & Park, supra note 85, at 563. Despite acknowledging that trait theory has 
not been proven, they nevertheless advocate the relevance of such evidence. "Unless one 
knows that this propensity does not extend to the situation in which the crime charged alleg-
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The research supports what the California Supreme Court ruled in 
People v. Steele. 99 In Steele, the court held that a woman's prior sexual 
conduct was not admissible to prove her current sexual conduct. lOO Just 
because a woman consents to sex in one context, does not mean that she 
will consent again. Just because a man committed a sex-related offense 
does not mean that he will commit one again. 101 We cannot assume that a 
person always acts the same way, even if that provides us a comforting 
way of viewing the world. Similarly, we cannot assume there is a charac-
.,: h . . 1 d' 102 ter lor t e propensIty to commIt sex-re ate cnmes. 
There is little empirical basis for the assumption that prior acts prove 
propensity to commit future crime. There is, however, empirical evidence 
that juries may convict based on character evidence, instead of evidence of 
the current crime. 103 
The real danger in admission of character evidence is that 
the jury will give the evidence more weight than it de-
serves, either by overestimating its probative value on the 
crime charged or by concluding that even if the defendant 
is innocent of the crime charged, he is a 'bad man' who 
b 1 " '1 104 e ongs lllJaI . 
The danger of convicting the innocent is greatest in stranger rape cases 
edly occurred, his prior rapes are relevant evidence of his guilt." Id. On the contrary, given 
the ambivalence about trait theory in the literature, the weight that jurors give bad character 
evidence, the presumption of innocence in criminal cases, and any doubts about whether 
propensity extends to a particular situation should be resolved against relevance. Bryden 
and Park do suggest that "[t]he key, perhaps, is not the intrinsic reliability of character 
analysis but the sophistication with which one attempts to infer propensity." Id. Section 
1108, which permits using a prior indecent exposure charge to prove propensity to commit 
sodomy, makes no pretensions to sophistication. 
99. 210 Cal. App. 3d 67. 
100. Id. at 76. For an analysis of the court's reasoning, see discussion supra pp. 107-108. 
101. This is particularly true when the two crimes are unrelated as with indecent exposure 
and sodomy. 
102. It is often difficult to distinguish between character for committing an offense and 
Evidence Code section 11 Ol (b) (evidence admissible as evidence of lack of mistake, intent, 
modus operandi or lack of good faith belief in consent). In child molestation cases particu-
larly, that line has become blurred. For instance, prior offenses of forced oral copulation on 
a minor were held relevant to show common design or plan in a prosecution for lewd and 
lascivious conduct upon a child in which the main issue was whether the acts described by 
the victim occurred. See People v. Dancer, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1677, 1688-89 (1996). In an-
other case, photographs which the defendant possessed of young boys and other pedophiliac 
pornography were admitted to show intent to molest a young boy. See People v. Memro, 11 
Cal. 4th 786, 861-62 (1995). The court held that though the photographs themselves were 
not explicit, the jury could infer from them that the defendant had a sexual attraction to 
young boys and proceeded to act on it. See id. 
103. See Mendez, California's New Law, supra note 89, at 1045 ("[J]urors may give 
greater weight to evidence of misconduct and dishonesty than to favorable evidence."). 
1 04. Bryden & Park, supra note 85, at 565. 
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where the defense is misidentification. The prosecution will use the char-
acter evidence to argue that it cannot be a coincidence that the person 
identified has a history of sex-related crimes. The jury will believe the 
identification is corroborated and so convict. However, eyewitness identi-
fication can be very unreliable. lOS The media report numerous examples of 
men wrongly convicted in identification cases who were exonerated by 
DNA evidence, often after years of imprisonment. 106 
Our justice system cannot rely on physical evidence to save someone 
from a wrongful conviction. The constitutional burden falls in the other 
direction. The government carries the burden of proving the identity of the 
defendant and should not be allowed to use character evidence indirectly to 
show identity. The focus should be on the accuracy of the identification. 
The danger of admitting character evidence lies in the possibility that ju-
ries will convict based on the character of a defendant without testing the 
sufficiency of the identification. 
C. A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS 
Prior to the enactment of rape shield laws, a complainant was at risk of 
having her sexual history dragged into the public arena. Because her his-
tory was considered relevant to show her character, defense attorneys had 
the ethical obligation to gain whatever knowledge they could about her 
private life. 107 Now, however, rape shield laws protect women by allowing 
them to fress a complaint while knowing that their privacy remains pro-
tected. 10 
Section 1108, however, does not protect women. Some Inay argue that 
making convictions in sex cases easier for the prosecution benefits women. 
105. See, e.g., Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 975-88 (1977). 
106. See Man Cleared of Rape By DNA is Pardoned, L.A TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at A24; 
Bruce Cadwallader, Inmate Walks After Eleven Years. COLUMBUS DISPATCH (OHIO), Dec. 7, 
1996, at AI; Dave Harmon, DNA Test Casts Doubt On Rape Verdict, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Sept. 25, 1997, at AI; Mike Smith, Nearly Three Decades Later, DNA Proves 
Man was Wrongly Convicted, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Aug. 4, 1997, at 1. 
It must be acknowledged that historically, rape allegations have been used for politi-
cal, especially racist, purposes. "[T]he rape charge has been indiscriminately aimed at 
Black men, the guilty and the innocent alike." ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 
172 (1983). Between 1930 and 1967, 405 of the 455 men executed for rape were black. 
See id. See also Friedman, supra note 63, at 1368 n.103 (referring to the Bureau of Prisons 
National Prisoner Statistics No. 45, Capital Punishment 1930 - 1968). The Scottsboro Boys 
trial, in which nine young southern black men were accused of raping two white women, is 
merely the most notorious example. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). For fur-
ther discussion, see Sakthi Murphy, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectation: Limits on 
using a Rape Victim's Sexual History to Show the Defendant's Mistaken Belief in Consent, 
79 CAL. L. REv. 541, 576 n.32 (1991). 
107. See Peter M. Hazelton, Rape Shield Laws: Limits on Zealous Advocacy, AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 35, 40 (1991). 
108. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c)(l). 
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But that benefit comes at the cost of constitutional principles which protect 
us alL Exclusion of character evidence is based on due process notions of 
fundamental justice 109 and the right to a fair triaL 110 The risk of conviction 
based on a jury's perception that the defendant is of bad character under-
mines the presumption of innocence and lessens the state's burden of proof 
of the crime. A person should be tried based on facts, not on speculation, 
prejudice, or fear. 
The United States Supreme Court has never directly decided whether 
using prior crimes as character evidence violates due process. In Spencer 
v. Texas, however, the question came before the Court in the context of a 
habitual offender law. 1 Il The issue was whether using prior convictions in 
the prosecution's case in chief to prove a defendant was a habitual offender 
violated due process. 112 Three defendants were charged with being re-
cidivist offenders under a Texas statute which allowed the jury to enhance 
the defendant's sentence if he had previous convictions. 113 The convic-
tions were admitted into evidence during the prosecution's case in chief.114 
However, the juries were each instructed that they could not use the prior 
convictions as evidence of guilt of the charges for which the defendants 
I b . . d 115 were current y elng tne . . 
A divided Court held that use of the prior convictions did not offend 
due process principles. 116 The majority opinion noted that it did not neces-
sarily consider the Texas statute the wisest or fairest way to prove recidi-
vism and that it might prefer a two-step trial which introduced the prior 
convictions only after the jury had determined guilt of the charges al-
leged. 1l7 Yet, it cited its traditional hesitance to dictate rules of criminal 
procedure to the states as a reason to refrain from finding that the Texas 
. I d d 118 statutes VlO ate ue process. 
The Court also noted that prior crimes evidence may be introduced for 
other legitimate purposes, such as to prove intent or to rebut the defen-
dant's credibility after he testifies. 119 The Court acknowledged the legiti-
mate purpose of recidivist statutes-to punish habitual criminals more se-
109. See Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948). 
110. See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993); Henry v. Estelle, 993 
F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1993); Jarnmal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918,920 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
Ill. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 557-60 (1967). 
112. Seeid. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. at 563-65. 
117. See id. at 564-65. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart both agreed that the two-
step trial method was "far superior" to Texas' method as a way to decrease potential preju-
dice. Id. at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring), 579-80 (Warren, J., concurring and dissenting). 
118. See id. at 568. 
119. See id. at 560. 
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verely.120 The Court reasoned that the admission of prior convictions for 
purposes of proving recidivism was a legitimate state purpose outweighing 
the acknowledged prejudice which prior crimes evidence creates. 121 
The main difference between Spencer and section 1108 is that in 
Spencer, prior convictions were not admitted for the purpose of proving 
the defendants' bad character. 122 All three juries were instructed that they 
may not consider the conviction as evidence of the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence of the charge for which he was on trial.123 The very purpose of 
section 1108, on the other hand, is to use prior acts as character evidence to 
prove the defendant's guilt. 124 
Further, the Spencer majority noted that the sort of evidence intro-
duced to show a conviction is "usually, and in recidivist cases almost al-
ways, of a documentary kind.,,12S That is, the prosecution introduces the 
docket to prove the conviction. The Court pointed out that "in the cases 
before us there is no claim that its presentation was in any way inflamma-
tory.,,126 Yet, section 1108 seems to permit live witnesses and physical 
evidence, photographs, and whatever else the prosecution considers neces-
sary to prove the uncharfed prior bad acts regardless of the inflammatory 
nature of the evidence. 12 
Chief Justice Warren, in his dissent and concurrence, pointed out that 
the majority in Spencer "never faces up to the problem" of whether using 
prior convictions as evidence of criminal propensity to prove guilt would 
violate due process. I28 He powerfully demonstrated that it would. First, he 
noted that recidivist statutes have never been thought to allow the State to 
use prior convictions to show probability of guilt. 129 "The fact of prior 
convictions is not intended to make it any easier for the State to prove the 
commission of a subsequent crime.,,130 He argued that if it were so, the 
statutes would violate the Due Process Clause: 
Whether or not a State has recidivist statutes on its books, it is well 
established that evidence of prior convictions may not be used by 
the State to show that the accused has a criminal disposition and 
that the probability that he committed the crime currently charged 
120. See id. at 556. 
121. See id. at 566-69. 
122. Nor was unproven evidence admitted. The Spencer Court was considering only prior 
convictions, not mere allegations, as section 1108 allows. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 558. 
123. See id. at 557-60. Note that three cases were consolidated upon appeal. See id. at 
555. 
124. See CRIM. PROC. REPORT, supra note 6. 
125. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 562. 
126. Id. 
127. See CAL. EVlD. CODE § 1108(b). 
128. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 571 (Warren, C.J., dissenting and concurring). 
129. See id. 
130. Id. 
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is increased. While this Court has never held that the use of prior 
convictions to show nothing more than a disposition to commit 
crime would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, our decisions exercising supervisory power over 
criminal trials in federal courts, as well as decisions by courts of 
appeals and of state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes 
introduced for no purpose other than to show criminal disposition 
would violate the Due Process Clause. 131 
115 
Chief Justice Warren further concluded that using prior crimes as evi-
dence of criminal propensity is unconstitutional because it interferes with 
the defendant's ability to have a fair trial: 
Evidence of prior convictions has been forbidden because it jeop-
ardizes the presumption of innocence of the crime currently 
charged. A jury might punish an accused for being guilty of a 
previous offense, or feel that incarceration is justified because the 
accused is a "bad man," without regard to his guilt of the crime 
currently charged. Of course it flouts human nature to suppose 
that a jury would not consider a defendant's previous trouble with 
the law in deciding whether he has committed the crime currently 
charged against him. As Mr. Justice Jackson put it in a famous 
phrase, "[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be 
overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers 
know to be unmitigated fiction.,,132 
Chief Justice Warren also pointed out the illogic involved in the ma-
jority's assertion that because recidivist statutes have a legitimate purpose, 
just as there is a legitimate purpose in admitting prior convictions for non-
character uses, admitting the prior conviction to show recidivism out-
weighs any prejudice to the defendant. l33 He noted that this apparently 
plausible syllogism fails because the two premises together do not add up 
h .. , 1.
134 to t e maJonty s conc USlon: 
I believe the Court has fallen into the logical fallacy sometimes 
known as the fallacy of the undistributed middle, because it has 
failed to examine the supposedly shared principle between admis-
sion of prior crimes related to guilt and admission in connection 
with recidivist statutes. That the admission in both situations may 
serve a valid purpose does not demonstrate that the former practice 
justifies the latter any more than the fact that men and dogs are 
131. Id. at 572-74. 
132. Id. at 575 (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., concurring». 
133. See id. 
134. See id. at 577-78. 
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animals means that men and dogs are the same in all respects. 135 
Chief Justice Warren concluded that the majority allowed its approval 
of recidivist statutes' goals to cloud its judgment about whether the statutes 
were constitutional. 136 The same danger confronts us with section 1108. 
No one argues with the proposition that it is right to convict sex offenders. 
However, such an emotionally powerful argument begs the question of 
whether admission of prior bad acts to show character is the proper way to 
obtain convictions. Because of the potential for reducing the prosecution's 
burden and the violence such evidence does to the presumption of inno-
cence, the admission of this evidence is more likely to result in convictions 
of the innocent, as well as the guilty. 
Two federal cases illustrate how the United States Courts of Appeal 
have dealt with the use of prior bad acts to show character. 137 Both found 
that doing so violated due process principles. 138 The first, Lovely v. United 
States, involved the same kind of circumstances to which section 1108 
applies. 139 A woman alleged she had been raped. 140 The defendant admit-
ted they had sex, but claimed it was consensual. 141 Consent was the only 
issue in the trial. 142 Over defense objections, the trial court allowed the 
testimony of another woman who alleged that he had raped her fifteen days 
before the rape for which he was on trial. 143 On direct appeal, the court re-
versed. l44 It noted: 
[T]he only question was whether he had had carnal knowledge of 
her forcibly and against her will. The fact, if it was a fact, that he 
had ravished another woman some weeks before, threw no light 
whatever on that question. It showed merely that he was a bad 
man, likely to commit that sort of crime; and this is precisely what 
the prosecution is not allowed to show in a criminal case. 145 
The court held: 
The rule which thus forbids that introduction of evidence of other 
offenses having no reasonable tendency to prove the crime 
135. Id. at 578-79. 
136. Id. at 579-80. 
137. See Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1948); Panzavecchia v. 
Wainwright, 658 F.2d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1981). See also McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d at 
1385. 
138. See Love(v, 169 F.2d at 389; Panzavecchia, 658 F.2d at 350-54. 
139. 169 F. 2d at 388-89. 
140. See id. at 388. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 391. 
145. [d. at 388. 
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charged, except insofar as they may establish a criminal tendency 
on the part of the accused, is not a mere technical rule of law. It 
arises out of the fundamental demand for justice and fairness 
which lies at the basis of our jurisprudence. If such evidence were 
allowed, not only would the time of courts be wasted in the trial of 
collateral issues, but persons accused of crime would be greatly 
prejudiced before juries and would be otherwise embarrassed in 
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In the second case, Panzavecchia v. Wainwright, the court considered a 
writ of habeas corpus from a state court case in which the defendant had 
been simu1taneously tried for first degree murder and for being a felon in 
possession of a firearm. 147 The defense motion for severance of the 
charges had been denied. 148 The prosecution introduced evidence of the 
defendant's prior counterfeiting charge in order to prove the felon in pos-
. f f· h 149 seSSIOn 0 a Ire arm c arge. 
The Fifth Circuit held that the cases should have been severed. 150 The 
effect of admitting the prior conviction for the firearm was to permit evi-
dence in the murder case that, in the context of that charge, was nothing 
more than propensity evidence. 151 It concluded that admitting the evidence 
as merely propensity evidence violated the Due Process Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 152 
[T]he counterfeiting conviction . . . was totally irrelevant to the 
murder charge and the only purpose it served was to show bad 
character and propensity to commit a crime. Had the two offenses 
been tried separately, the counterfeiting conviction would never be 
admitted in the murder trial. . .. The prejudice which Florida and 
the federal courts have proscribed clearly existed and this preju-
dice rose to such a level as to make the petitioner's trial fundamen-
tally unfair and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 153 
If evidence of a prior conviction violated due process, then so must 
evidence where there was no conviction. If evidence of a guilty plea or 
conviction is so highly prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial, then 
evidence of unproven allegations must have the same prejudicial effect 
without any assurance of reliability. 154 
146. ld. at 389. 
147. 658 F.2d at 388-89. 
148. See id. at 338. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. at 341. 
151. See id. 
152. See id. at 338. 
153. ld. at 341. 
154. This analysis depends, of course, on the particularly prejudicial nature of pure charac-
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Allowing states to use sex crime propensjty evidence also violates due 
process in another way; it violates the reciprocity requirement. Reciprocity 
simply means that the defendant should be allowed the same rights to pres-
ent evidence as the prosecution enjoys. The United States Supreme Court, 
in Wardius v. Oregon, recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process incorporates the right to reciprocity. 155 The Court stated, "the 
Due Process Clause . . . does speak to the balance of forces between the 
accused and his accuser.,,156 It added, "[t]his Court has therefore been par-
ticularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits 
to the State when the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant's 
ability to secure a fair trial.,,157 Thus, the Court held that a rule requiring 
the defense to give notice of alibi witnesses without a reciprocal require-
ment that the prosecution disclose its witnesses violated due process. 158 
In making its ruling, the Wardius Court relied in part on Gideon v. 
Wainright, the seminal case holding that a criminal defendant has the right 
to an attorney. 159 One reason the Gideon Court gave for its holding was 
that if the State has a lawyer, the defendant is entitled to have one, too. 160 
The Wardius Court also relied on Washington v. Texas, which held that the 
State could not limit the defendant's right to call witnesses. 161 Referring to 
England's history of prohibiting defense witnesses, the Washington Court 
noted that the Framers of the Constitution felt it necessary to provide de-
fendants the right to compulsory process of the court "so that their own 
evidence, as well as the prosecution's, might be evaluated by the jury." 162 
Several California cases have recognized that the right of reciprocity 
extends to the reciprocal right to introduce evidence. In Evans v. Superior 
Court, the California Supreme Court recognized the right of the defendant 
to hold a line-up for purposes of introducing exculpatory evidence on the 
issue of identification. 163 "Because the People are in a position to compel a 
line-up and utilize what favorable evidence is derived therefrom, fairness 
requires that the accused be given a reciprocal right to discover and utilize 
contrary evidence."I64 
ter evidence. If there is a permissible use of the evidence, such as using prior bad acts to 
show motive, intent, etc., erroneous admission of that evidence would not violate due proc-
ess. See Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342, 350-54 (1990) (holding that introduction of evi-
dence relating to crime that defendant had previously been acquitted of committing did not 
violate double jeopardy or due process). 
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Similarly, the defendant has a right to introduce hearsay evidence 
through a police officer, since the same right has been granted to the State 
under Penal Code section 872(b).165 The California Supreme Court first 
addressed the issue in Whitman v. Superior Court which, while discussing 
a related issue, intimated in dicta that it might allow the defendant to call a 
police officer to testify to hearsay because the prosecution had the same 
right. 166 When directly faced with the issue, the Court of Appeal con-
cluded that the right of reciprocity meant the defense had the right to intro-
duce the same kind of hearsay evidence as the State. 167 
The rule of reciprocity should also apply to the use of character evi-
dence. The purpose is the same: to ensure basic fairness and enable the 
defendant to mount a complete defense. In People v. Hansel, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court stated that: 
The reciprocal pretrial discovery required in Wardius and Evans 
helps defendants to present their defense. Without equal access to 
any favorable evidence, defendants would be placed at a disadvan-
tage in relation to the state, and their ability either to demonstrate 
their own innocence or to avoid unfair surprise at trial would be 
reduced. The nonreciprocal procedures addressed in Wardius and 
Evans, therefore, directly implicate the right of the accused to a 
fair trial, even though the proceedings at issue occur before trial. 168 
Wardius and its progeny recognized that what one side may do, the 
other side may do as well. Now, section 1108 opens the door to defense 
attorneys seeking to introduce a complainant's sexual history. If a defen-
dant's character is probative and admissible, so therefore is a complain-
ant's. In our attempt to secure the conviction of sex offenders, we may 
have made women less secure. 
There are only three ways out of this conundrum. We can weaken the 
rape shield laws so that a woman's character is again admissible in sexual 
assault cases, to give defendants reciprocity with prosecutors; choose to 
protect rape shield laws by undermining the principle of due process and 
fundamental fairness in a jury trial; or finally, determine that section 1108 
is unconstitutionally infirm. In practice, using section 1108 will lead to 
injustice for someone-will it be women or the accused? 
V. CONCLUSION 
Section 1108 was unnecessary because legitimate, non-character use of 
165. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West 1985). 
166. Whitman v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 1082 (1991). 
167. See Nienhouse v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 83, 91 (1996). See also Garcia v. 
Superior Court, 1 Cal. App. 4th 979 (1991). 
168. People v. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th 1211, 1221 (1992). 
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prior crimes evidence was already available to the prosecution. Yet, in the 
quest to ensure convictions, the California Legislature, like Congress, has 
dramatically and precipitously eradicated hundreds of years of common 
law prohibitions against the use of character evidence. Section 1108 un-
dermines due process, endangers the presumption of innocence, and im-
perils the protections victims have gained in sex crimes cases. Bolstering 
the credibility of complainants may have seemed like a good idea at the 
time, but its consequences will be severe. 
